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Chapter 20
Differential Impact of Directors’ Social and
Financial Capital on Corporate Interlock
Formation
Nicholas Harrigan and Matthew Bond
20.1 Bipartite Society: The Individual and the Group
The interdependence of the individual and the organization is an enduring
theme in sociological thought. Cooley wrote that “man may be regarded
as the point of intersection of an indefinite number of circles representing
social groups, having as many arcs passing through him as there are
groups” (1902/1964, 148). Simmel (1955) captured the tension between
the individual and the organization when he defined two types of group
affiliation: “organic membership,” where the organization is not chosen
by the individual as an expression of his or her traits (e.g., as in the case
of the family), and “rational membership,” where the organization is
chosen as a conscious expression of the individual’s traits. For Simmel, the
most important outcome of an individual’s affiliation to an organization
was the constraint and socialization of the individual; an individual, he
laments, “is determined sociologically in the sense that groups ‘intersect’
in his person by virtue of his affiliations with them” (150).
Social network analysis has developed a distinctive and highly system-
atic set of methods for representation, measurement, and (more recently)
modeling of this interdependence called, variously, “membership net-
works,” “affiliation networks,” “bipartite networks,” and “two-mode
networks” (Breiger, 1974; Robins & Alexander, 2004; Wang, Sharpe,
Robins, & Pattison, 2009). The advantage of bipartite networks is that
they preserve the dualistic structure of organization–individual relations,
representing the network as ties between a set of individuals and a set of
organizations. They avoid simplifying the relationships into the one-mode
form of either a network of individuals or a network of organizations (see
Chapter 10, Section 10.2, for more on bipartite networks).
We are deeply indebted to Eleina Ailmchandani, Christine Chen, and Isaac Chin for their
heroic and patient research support for this chapter.
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Corporate interlocks have been one of the most studied affiliation net-
works in sociology (Domhoff, 1967, 1970, 1978, 1998, 2009; Domhoff
& Dye, 1987; Dooley, 1969; Emerson, 1962; Fitch & Oppenheimer,
1970; Koenig, Gogel, & Sonquist, 1979; Levine, 1972; Mace, 1971;
Mills, 1956; Mintz & Schwartz, 1985; Mizruchi, 1982; Ornstein, 1984;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Scott, 1997; Scott & Griff, 1984; Stearns &
Mizruchi, 1986; Sweezy, 1953; Useem, 1984; Zeitlin, 1974; Zweigenhaft
& Domhoff, 2006). Corporate interlocks are formed by the affiliation of
directors of corporations to corporate boards of governance. The popu-
larity of the study of corporate interlock networks stems from the data’s
public nature and therefore its relative accessibility, and the importance
of these networks of the governing boards of the largest economic actors
in the private economy.
20.1.1 Director Capital and Interlock Formation
This chapter models an Australian corporate interlock data set with
a bipartite exponential random graph model (ERGM) (see Chapter
10) using the BPNet software, a version of the PNet software (Wang,
Robins, & Pattison, 2009) for bipartite data. By using bipartite model-
ing, we are able to directly examine the interdependence long talked about
in the sociological literature. That is, we are able to study social tie forma-
tion (corporate interlocks) as a function of (1) the individuals’ attributes
(directors), (2) the groups’ attributes (corporations), (3) the interaction of
individual and group attributes, and (4) purely structural network effects
(social ties that form without reference to actor attributes).
Our primary substantive objective is to study the effects of director
characteristics on the pattern of corporate interlock formation. In partic-
ular, we are interested in the effects of three types of corporate director
power on the formation of corporate interlocks: (1) physical or financial
capital (i.e., wealth), (2) membership of exclusive businessmen’s clubs,
and (3) attendance at elite private schools.
Traditional elite and corporate interlock studies have tended to empha-
size the unifying role of director social capital and the convergence of the
many dimensions of director, corporate, social, and economic power at
the apex of the corporate community. We argue that there is consider-
able differentiation in the purpose and effects of the many different forms
of social and economic power within the corporate community. In par-
ticular, we argue that the alienability of the benefits of physical capital
(Coleman, 1990/1994) leads owners to place relatively low emphasis on
their own social capital (e.g., interlocks). We also argue that business-
men’s clubs and elite private schools, traditionally viewed as markers
of upper-class membership and facilitators of corporate unity, play dif-
ferent roles within the Australian corporate community: we hypothesize
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that businessmen’s clubs are bonding social capital (Putnam, 2000, 22–
24) closer to in-group social capital, binding those corporations with
common interests and identities, whereas private schools act as bridging
social capital, providing between-group social capital, drawing together
the disparate parts of the corporate community, with little differentia-
tion on the basis of interests and identities of corporate groups united by
private school ties.
In addition, we make three methodological contributions. First, we
demonstrate that there are purely structural network effects that oper-
ate on corporate interlocks, independent of the economic, political, and
sociological attributes of directors and corporations. In this, we are look-
ing for effects similar to the one-mode effects we call “path closure”
(Robins, Pattison, & Wang, 2009) or “transitivity” (Granovetter, 1973;
Holland & Leinhardt, 1976; Watts & Strogatz, 1998), and other effects
such as “popularity” (Barabasi & Albert, 1999; Frank & Strauss, 1986;
Wasserman & Pattison, 1996), in which ties form purely in response to
the pattern of ties that comprise the local neighborhood. In the case of
bipartite networks, we expect to find effects such as a tendency for 3-
paths (L3) to close and become 4-cycles (C4), and a tendency for popular
directors to become more popular (modeled with star configurations of
various sizes). Second, we demonstrate the added benefits, both in terms
of model fit and sociological explanatory power, of introducing director
and corporation attributes into bipartite modeling. We model the effects
of corporate attributes such as political donations, public listing, foreign
ownership, regulated industries, and turnover. We model the effect of
director attributes such as individual wealth, members of businessmen’s
clubs, and education at elite private schools. Finally, we explore the ben-
efit of the inclusion of interaction effects for the increased or decreased
likelihood of directorship formation between particular types of directors
and corporations.
20.2 Data and Measures
20.2.1 Social Network Data
The data comprise a network of directors and corporations collected by
Harrigan (2008). It is the network of the largest 248 corporations (as
measured by revenue) in Australia in February 2006. It includes pub-
licly listed and private corporations, as well as Australian and foreign-
owned corporations. There are 1,251 directors, who hold a total of 1,464
directorships. Data on corporations and directors were obtained from
IBISWorld (2006), the company that compiles the yearly Business Review
Weekly’s “Top 2000 Enterprises.”1
1 The authors want to express their gratitude to IBISWorld and Crown Content for their
provision, respectively, of the “Top 2000 Enterprises” and the “Who’s Who” databases.
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20.2.2 Actor-Relation Measures
Corporations have six binary attributes. Company size is a binary vari-
able that divides the corporations into two equal groups: the largest 124
corporations and the smallest 124 corporations, as measured by revenue.
Revenue data were also provided by IBISWorld. Corporations have two
(mutually exclusive) binary donation variables: “donate to both major
parties” (an indicator of moderate political activity) and “donate to con-
servatives only” (indicating donations to either the National Party or
the Liberal Party – the two major conservative parties that are typically
in coalition). Political donation data were downloaded from the Aus-
tralian Electoral Commission (AEC; 2006) Web site. Companies that
were publicly listed corporations were coded by the variable “public”
(“1” indicates that the company was listed on the stock exchange). Aus-
tralian ownership (=1) or foreign ownership (=0) was coded by the
variable “Australian.” As an indicator of interest in and interaction with
the political process of the state, firms were classified as to whether they
were located in “highly regulated industries.” The regulated industries
were coded using Burris’s (1987) classification and matched against the
two-digit Standard Industry Codes in the IBISWorld data set. “Regulated
industries” can be thought of as comprising four categories: transport
(road, rail, and air), communication, utilities (water, gas, and electricity),
and banking and insurance.2
Individual directors have three binary attributes: director wealth (or,
more accurately, “superwealth” = 1), attendance at an exclusive pri-
vate school (=1), and membership of an exclusive establishment gen-
tlemen’s club (=1). Previous studies suggest that wealth, especially old
wealth, may lead to political conservatism (Bond, 2003, 2004; Bond,
Glouharova, & Harrigan, 2010; Burris, 2000). Directors are classified as
“superwealthy” (=1) if they were listed in the Business Review Weekly’s
(2005) “Rich 200” list. In Australia, data were obtained from the social
directories “Who’s Who in Australia” and “Who’s Who in Australian
Business” (Crown Content, 2005a, 2005b). The majority (59.1%) of
the Australian directors had an entry in “Who’s Who.” This sample
compares favorably to previous studies, for example, 33.7% of Useem’s
(1984) UK sample and 30.3% of Bond’s (2007) UK sample were found in
directories.
“School” was defined as attendance at one of 17 exclusive private
schools.3 This list was obtained by comparing the 3,000 secondary
2 Industries classified as highly regulated were air and space transport, communication
services, electricity and gas supply, finance, insurance, other transport, rail transport,
road transport, services to finance and insurance, services to transport, water supply,
sewerage and drainage services, and water transport.
3 These exclusive private schools include Anglican Church Grammar School (QLD), Bris-
bane Boys College (QLD), Brisbane Grammar School (QLD), Geelong Grammar School
(VIC), Melbourne Grammar School (VIC), Scotch College (VIC), Wesley College (VIC),
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schools in Australia on a range of socioeconomic and status mea-
sures, including the socioeconomic status of parents, school fees, listing
in “Who’s Who,” and the percentage of ex-students who were mem-
bers of the exclusive businessmen’s clubs. In Australia, “clubs” were
defined as a list of eleven prominent businessmen’s clubs.4 This list
was identified through the use of secondary sources such as studies of
upper-class clubs, reciprocal membership arrangements, and membership
procedures.
Summary statistics for the attributes and derived attribute interaction
effects are provided in Table 20.1. All variables are binary. We pro-
vide a count of corporations/directors/directorships with each attribute
(column 1). To provide a baseline value (expected value) for interac-
tion effects, we calculate the number of directorships that would occur
if directorships arose from the random assortment of ties between cor-
porations and directors. The second column (percentage of total corpo-
rations/directors/expected directorships) divides the first column by the
total number of corporations (248), directors (1,251), or directorships
(1,464), respectively. Column 3 is a count of the total observed direc-
torships for this attribute–attribute interaction. Column 4 is column 3
divided by the total number of directorships (1,464). Column 5 “over-
representation” is percent directorships (column 4) divided by column
2: a value greater than one indicates that directors/corporations/director–
corporation interactions have more directorships than would be expected
given a random assortment of directorships. Column 6 indicates whether
the over- or underrepresentation is statistically significant (using a chi-
square test on the 2 × 2 matrix of the expected and realized number of
directorships).
20.2.3 Analyses
The analyses in this chapter begin with a brief discussion of the bivariate
analysis presented in Table 20.1, attempting to showwhat can be achieved
with cross-tabulation and establishing a baseline against which to judge
the added utility of more complex modeling, in particular, the bipartite
ERGM. The remainder of the chapter uses the bipartite social selection
model presented in Chapter 10.
Xavier College (VIC), Knox Grammar School (NSW), St. Ignatius’ College, Senior School
(NSW), Sydney Church of England Grammar School (NSW), Sydney Grammar School
(NSW), The King’s School (NSW), Aquinas College (WA), Scotch College (WA), Hale
School (WA), and Collegiate School of St Peter (SA).
4 These prominent businessmen’s clubs include Athenaeum (VIC), Australian (VIC), Mel-
bourne (VIC), Australian (NSW), Union (NSW), Brisbane (QLD), Weld (WA), Adelaide
(SA), Tasmanian (TAS), Launceston (TAS), and Elanora (NSW).
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Table 20.1. Summary statistics for attributes and attribute interactions
(1) (2)
(3) (4) (5) (6)
corporation
attributes
count cor-
porations
% corpo-
rations
count
director-
ships
%
director-
ships
over-
represen-
tation
sign. (chi-
square
test)
Conservative 10 4.0 47 3.2 0.80
Bipartisan 45 18.1 346 23.6 1.30 ***
Australian 144 58.1 1070 73.1 1.26 ***
Listed 115 46.4 958 65.4 1.41 ***
Regulated 67 27.0 419 28.6 1.06
Revenue 124 50.0 837 57.2 1.14 ***
director attributes
count
directors
%
directors
count
director-
ships
%
director-
ships
over-
represen-
tation
sign. (chi-
square
test)
Wealth 34 2.7 36 2.5 0.90
Club 155 12.4 229 15.6 1.26 ***
School 83 6.6 135 9.2 1.39 ***
interaction effects
expected
director-
ships
expected
% direc-
torships
count
director-
ships
%
director-
ships
over-
represen-
tation
sign. (chi-
square
test)
Conservative&
Wealth
2 0.1 3 0.2 1.87
Bipartisan&
Wealth
7 0.5 12 0.8 1.66
Australian&
Wealth
23 1.6 35 2.4 1.51 *
Listed&
Wealth
18 1.3 27 1.8 1.46
Regulated&
Wealth
11 0.7 6 0.4 0.56
Revenue&Wealth 20 1.4 16 1.1 0.80
Conservative&
Club
7 0.5 5 0.3 0.68
Bipartisan&Club 33 2.2 76 5.2 2.31 ***
Australian&Club 105 7.2 199 13.6 1.89 ***
Listed&Club 84 5.7 191 13.0 2.27 ***
Regulated&Club 49 3.3 89 6.1 1.82 ***
Revenue&Club 91 6.2 159 10.9 1.75 ***
Conservative&
School
4 0.3 1 0.1 0.26
Bipartisan&
School
18 1.2 50 3.4 2.84 ***
Australian&
School
56 3.9 114 7.8 2.02 ***
Listed&School 45 3.1 114 7.8 2.53 ***
Regulated&
School
26 1.8 50 3.4 1.91 ***
Revenue&School 49 3.3 94 6.4 1.94 ***
* p value < .05.
*** p value < .001.
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20.3 Model Specification
20.3.1 Independent Bivariate Attribute Analysis
A considerable section of the interlocking directorates research does not
go beyond descriptive statistics similar to those in Table 20.1. The purpose
of these studies is to find over- or underrepresented groups by comparing
directorships across groups and with a baseline random distribution.
20.3.2 Purely Structural Effects
In our bipartite ERGM, up to five structural effects are used in various
combinations: the edge parameter [L], alternating k-stars for directors [K-
Sp] and corporations [K-Sa], and alternating k-cycles for directors [K-Cp]
and corporations [K-Ca]. The edge parameter [L] represents the baseline
probability of forming a tie and is similar to the intercept in a classic
regression model. The star effects can be thought of as a “popularity”
effect or a “rich get richer” effect (also called the “Matthew effect”),
whereby actors with ties have an increased likelihood of receiving further
ties. In this chapter, we use the alternating k-star parameters described
in Chapter 10 (see Figure 10.8; the rationale for the alternating version
of these statistics is given in Chapter 6). The alternating k-cycles ([K-
Cp] and [K-Ca]) parameters capture the propensity of directors (p) and
corporations (a) to be part of 4-cycles (i.e., to engage in closed bipartite
network structures) (see Chapter 10 and Figure 10.11).
20.3.3 Models with Attributes: Actor-Relation Effects
Three types of attribute parameters are used in our models: director
attribute activity [rP], corporation attribute activity [rA] (see Figure
10.12), and corporation–director attribute interaction [rAP] (see Figure
10.15). rP and rA are simply the main effect for each director and
corporation attribute. Thus, our models include nine of these effects (six
corporation effects: [rA_Conservative], [rA_Bipartisan], [rA_Australian],
[rA_Listed], [rA_Regulated], and [rA_Revenue], and three director
effects: [rP_Wealth], [rP_Club], and [rP_School]). A significant positive
parameter estimate for one of the attribute effects would mean that
corporations (directors) with this attribute have a greater probability
(than corporations (directors) who do not have this attribute) of holding
directorships.
rAP parameters capture the increased (or decreased) likelihood of a tie
forming between a corporation with a particular attribute (e.g., “Aus-
tralian”) and a director with a particular attribute (e.g., “school”). These
were described as “between node set” parameters in Chapter 10. For our
data set, there are eighteen possible interaction effects (6 corporation
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attributes × 3 director attributes). A range of higher-order attribute
parameters are available in BPNet (see Chapter 10), but for reasons of par-
simony, we restricted ourselves to the thirty-two parameters mentioned.
20.4 Results
20.4.1 Results for Independent Bivariate Analysis
Table 20.1 presents a classic bivariate overrepresentation analysis that
is common to the interlock literature. There are three notable effects
present. First, bipartisan donor corporations, Australian and publicly
listed corporations, and directors with elite private schooling or mem-
bership of exclusive gentlemen’s clubs have, on average, considerably
more directorships. Second, the wealthy are significantly overrepresented
in Australian-owned corporations. Third, directors from exclusive clubs
and schools are significantly overrepresented in bipartisan, Australian,
public-listed, regulated, and large corporations.
In addition, a number of characteristics seem to predispose directors
and/or corporations to underrepresentation (e.g., conservative directors
and the interaction of regulated corporations and wealthy directors).
However, the “law of small numbers” means that it is difficult to be
statistically confident that a “rare event” is even rarer than (un)expected.
Thus, none of the underrepresentation findings in Table 20.1 are statisti-
cally significant.
These bivariate tables, however, involve no controls for either struc-
tural network effects or any of the other attribute effects. As is shown,
the addition of these elements to our modeling considerably changes the
interpretation of the underlying data.
20.4.2 Results for Purely Structural Effects
Table 20.2 presents two fitted models with purely structural effects. We
found for this particular network that we cannot have both K-Cp and
K-Ca in the same model due to convergence issues. In line with Wang,
Sharpe, Robins, and Pattison (2009), we present two alternative models,
one with each possible k-cycle parameter.
Both models perform significantly better than a random graph in cap-
turing structural graph statistics (results of which are not shown but
that were estimated with edge parameter [L] = –5.34). There is a nega-
tive value of the director popularity [K-Sp], indicating that there is little
variation on the degree distribution and not many high-degree nodes.
However, in line with Wang, Sharpe, Robins, and Pattison (2009), we
had a poor fit on the classic 4-cycle parameter [C4], which suggests that
improving these structural effects is a substantial area of future research.
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Table 20.2. Results of two bipartite ERGMs of directorships including
only purely structural effects
estimates (SEs)
parameter model A model B
Purely structural effects with director
4-cycle effect
with corporation
4-cycle effect
Edge [L] −3.47 (0.26)* −2.38 (0.37)*
Director popularity [K-Sp] −4.54 (0.21)*
Corporation popularity [K-Sa] 0.65 (0.10)* 0.15 (0.18)
Director 4-cycles [K-Cp] −4.00 (0.19)*
Corporation 4-cycles [K-Ca] 0.06 (0.01)*
* Significant effect
20.4.3 Results for Models Including Purely Structural and
Actor-Relation Effects
Table 20.3 presents two fitted models: the first (model C) with struc-
tural and actor-relation effects; and the second (model D) with structural,
actor-relation, and interaction effects for actor-relations.
For model D, several interaction effects had to be dropped because
estimations showed that they were unstable, either because there were
almost no ties (e.g., [rAP_Conservative&School] had one observation)
or because they represented virtually all ties of the main effect (e.g.,
[rAP_Wealth&Australian] overlapped with thirty-five of the thirty-six
directorships of the [rA_Wealth] statistic). All main effects for attributes
were left in model D as controls for the interaction effects.
The purely structural effects from model B are robust and remain sig-
nificant in both models C and D, despite the addition of up to sixteen
attribute effects. The main effects of the actor-relation effects in model C
suggest a slightly different interpretation to descriptive statistics in Table
20.1. In particular, bipartisan donor corporations, the second most over-
represented type of corporation in Table 20.1, do not have significantly
greater directorships in either model C or model D.
The addition of interaction effects to the bipartite ERGM draws out
two further findings. Although in Table 20.1, club and school interaction
effects follow almost identical patterns, model D shows that they operate
according to very different principles. In model D, the effect of the clubs
variable loads completely on the club interaction effects. The main effect
for club becomes insignificant, and the high number of directorships of
club members is explained by their high propensity to hold directorships
on Australian, public listed, regulated, and large (revenue) corporations.
In contrast, the main effect for schools remains highly significant, and
only seems to be associated with positive interaction effects with public
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Table 20.3. Two bipartite ERGM of directorships, with structural,
actor-relation, and actor-relation interaction effects
estimates (SEs)
parameter model C model D
structural effects
and director and
corporation
attribute effects
structural effects,
attribute effects, and
company-director
attribute interactions
Purely structural effects
Edge [L] −2.14 (0.22)* −1.98 (0.24)*
Director popularity [K-Sp] −4.90 (0.23)* −4.91 (0.23)*
Corporation popularity [K-Sa]
Director 4-cycles [K-Cp]
Corporation 4-cycles [K-Ca] −0.05 (0.02)* −0.05 (0.02)*
Actor-relation effects
Corporation (a) attribute main effects
rA_Conservative −0.17 (0.18)
rA_Bipartisan 0.01 (0.08)
rA_Australian 0.28 (0.09)* 0.25 (0.10)*
rA_Listed 0.78 (0.11)* 0.67 (0.12)*
rA_Regulated 0.01 (0.07)
rA_Revenue 0.17 (0.06)* 0.13 (0.07)
Director (p) attribute main effects
rP_Wealth −0.87 (0.48) −0.59 (0.52)
rP_Club 1.08 (0.19)* −0.06 (0.29)
rP_School 1.37 (0.24)* 0.82 (0.34)*
Interaction effects
rAP_Revenue&Wealth −0.55 (0.37)
rAP_Australian&Club 0.34 (0.27)
rAP_Listed&Club 0.65 (0.27)*
rAP_Regulated&Club 0.54 (0.15)*
rAP_Revenue&Club 0.36 (0.17)*
rAP_Bipartisan&School 0.44 (0.20)*
rAP_Listed&School 0.53 (0.29)
* Significant effect
listed corporations and bipartisan donor corporations. As is discussed in
the next section, these patterns of interaction suggest very different social
and socializing roles for these two upper-class institutions.
In line with the bivariate analysis, there remains sharp contrast between
the high numbers of directorships held by directors belonging to elite clubs
or from elite schools and the low number of positions held by wealthy
directors. There is a negative but nonsignificant relationship between
wealthy directors and fewer directorships in model C. In model D, there is
a negative but nonsignificant interaction of wealth and revenue. Although
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both effects are nonsignificant, they are both negative, and importantly,
we would expect wealth to be positively related to directorships.
20.5 Discussion
Substantively, there are three major lessons about the nature of the “cap-
ital” that directors wield in the corporate boardroom and broader corpo-
rate community. In this Australian sample, different forms of “capital”
lead to diametrically opposed director behavior. Directors with “finan-
cial” or “physical” capital (i.e., the owners and superwealthy) have fewer
directorships than would be expected for their status. They have the same,
or possibly fewer, directorships than the average director of a top 248
company. The reason for this is not entirely clear. One possible mecha-
nism is provided by Coleman’s (1990/1994, 315–316) observation that
physical capital is alienable, and therefore the benefits of an investment
may be captured by the owner. In contrast, the social capital contained
in interlocks is inherently inalienable; that is, it belongs in the relation-
ships between people. The observed effect may be driven by a mechanism
that is as simple as follows: for an owner-director, the returns of focused
attention on one company are much greater than they are for any other
type of director. An owner not only gains the benefits of improvement
to his or her own property, but he or she can also focus attention on
what is potentially the greatest loss. In contrast, a non-owning director
appropriates less of his or her own work in any particular company and
has less to lose by serving on multiple boards, particularly if one of the
companies fails.
Directors with upper-class social capital appear to fulfill very different
functions depending on their specific social capital. Directors with mem-
bership of exclusive businessmen’s clubs appear to have a form of social
capital that is much like Putnam’s (2000) “bonding social capital”: it is
specific to a particular group of Australian, regulated, large, and public
listed corporations. Outside this circle, it provides little advantage (no
main effect). However, within this grouping, it provides a substantial
social bond, integrating a particularly important grouping of the Aus-
tralian corporate elite. Undoubtedly, the specificity of this form of social
capital arises partly because of its constant renewal. Clubs are not a place
you graduate from at age 18. Rather you join them at 40 or 50 years of
age, and they introduce you to a specific active social world that has a
physical location, events, membership lists, and culture.
In contrast, elite private school attendance appears to provide a much
more diffuse and generalized form of social capital, and one that is
in many ways akin to Putnam’s (2000) “bridging social capital.” Pri-
vate school attendance is much less specific to a particular corporate
Directors’ Social and Financial Capital 271
community. The main effect of school attendance on directorships is still
highly significant once interactions are taken into account. The specific
corporations that school attendance interacts with are very general cate-
gories of corporations: bipartisan corporations are not a community, but
rather a set of more politically active corporations that potentially need
directors with social capital. Thus, the relationship between bipartisan
corporations and school graduates could simply reflect a form of mutu-
ally beneficial exchanges taking place between more “political” corpora-
tions and more “reputable” directors. Similarly, public listed companies
have concerns with public and investor relations. Director social capital
can add prestige to a public company that would be completely superflu-
ous for a private corporation with two shareholders. The view of school
attendance as “bridging social capital” is further supported by the lack of
a significant relationship with other corporate attributes: they are equally
likely to serve on foreign or Australian boards, small or large companies,
and companies with high government regulation or those with little.
Methodologically, there are a number of important findings. We note
that with this data set, we had trouble fully modeling the purely struc-
tural features of bipartite networks. Specifically, 4-cycles were an issue.
Nonetheless, we found substantial purely structural network effects that
could not be effectively accounted for by the incorporation of direc-
tor and company attribute effects into an ERGM. There are tendencies
toward dispersal of degree and the generation of 4-cycles, which require
purely structural network effects to properly model director networks.
The importance of this finding is that it provides evidence that direc-
torships cannot simply be explained by the attributes of companies and
directors. Methods that focus only on director and company attributes
may overestimate the impact of these attributes and therefore underplay
some of the purely structural social processes through which directorships
emerge.
